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Abstract
This paper presents the ARAMIS project accepted for funding in the 5th Framework
Programme of the European Commission, which started on January 2002.
The ARAMIS project aims at developing a new risk assessment methodology which
allows to evaluate the risk level of an industrial plant by taking into account
prevention measures against major accidents and the vulnerability of its environment.
The methodology will support the harmonised implementation of the SEVESO II
Directive.
The project is built to result in the composition of an integrated risk index based on
the definition of Reference Scenarios and combining the evaluation of: 1. Scenario
consequence severity 2. Safety management effectiveness affecting the probability of
occurrence of major accidents 3. Environment vulnerability. The methodology will be
validated with case studies. Efforts are given to disseminate the methodology to
decision-makers in charge of the control of major accident hazards. Thus the project
development will be continuously monitored by a review team gathering risk experts
from industry and EU competent authorities in order to ensure the widest acceptance
of the approach.
1. Introduction
The ARAMIS project was submitted for funding in the 5th Framework Programme of
the European Commission in February 2001 under the programme "Environment and
Sustainable Development", in the chapter untitled "The fight against major natural
and technological hazards" of the Work Programme. This 3-years project started in
January 2002.
The ARAMIS methodology builds further on methods studied in the 4th Framework
Programme such as in the ASSURANCE3 project, a benchmark exercise on the
uncertainties in risk analysis, and developed in the I-RISK project, which provides a
a
 Assessment of the Uncertainties in Risk ANalysis of Chemical Establishments, n° ENV4970627.
b
 Development of an integrated technical and management risk control and monitoring methodology for
managing and quantifying on-site and off-site risks, n° ENV4960243.
methodology for in-depth judgement of safety management requirements for the
design, operation and maintenance of major hazards plants.
The development of ARAMIS is justified by the need of the elaboration of a
methodology giving consistent rules for the identification of scenarios that take into
account mitigation devices and some aspects of safety management, and being
recognised by risk experts from Competent Authorities and Industry.
Beside, there is an need to establish a method that is capable to assess the risk level of
an installation by integrating the preventive measures implemented by the operators.
Such a method is a prerequisite in order to reach the goals of the SEVESO n
Directive, that are to improve the prevention linked in particular with the safety
management. So, the ARAMIS methodology propose to characterise the risk level
with an integrated risk index composed with independent parameters related to the
consequence severity evaluation of scenarios, the prevention management
effectiveness and the environment vulnerability estimation describing the sensitivity
of the potential targets located in the vicinity of the SEVESO n establishments.
The application of this method will result in a more consistent and harmonised risk
evaluation and safety management strategy in all European Countries.
The paper starts with the presentation of the context of the major-accident hazards
control and prevention in the EU. Then, the objectives of the project and the work
contents are described in details. Finally, the expected impacts of such a methodology
are addressed.
2. Context of major-accident hazards control and prevention
The 1999 annual report from the European Environment Agency [1] indicates that the
trend in accidents shows that many of the often seemingly simple 'lessons learned'
from accidents have not yet been sufficiently implemented in industry's standards.
There is no doubt that disasters will continue to occur throughout the EU. Some of
these will be due to technology, some to the forces of nature. Inevitably there will be
loss of life and environmental damage. However, hazards can be managed to reduce
risks. The problem of low-probability, high-consequence events is likely to remain a
key issue in terms of risk management.
The most significant EU Directive to help protect people and the environment from
major accident hazards is the SEVESO n Directive. This Directive applies to those
industries that use significant amounts of hazardous substances. Their operators must
demonstrate that they apply a policy for the prevention of major accidents using
appropriate measures related to both "hardware" and "software" aspects, such as
safety management systems. This is likely to reduce risk levels, not only from high-
probability, low-consequence accidents, but also from low-probability, high-
consequence events, although these are by nature difficult to address.
In the SEVESO n Directive, the objectives in terms of risk management are very
clear, but the remaining question is: How to reach them? For example, there is no
harmonised definition of the scenarios that have to be considered for risk assessment.
Typically, the chosen scenarios (BLEVE, total loss of containment, fire in the largest
tank, explosion of the largest mass of explosive, etc.) can be different according to the
specific risk analysts and according to the deterministic or risk-based approach of the
country applying the Directive. This situation is confirmed by the results of the EC
project ASSURANCE, in which 6 European organisations perform a benchmark
exercise for the risk analysis of a specific plant. The partners use various hazard
analysis techniques and arrive at quite different conclusions with respect to the
scenarios that are relevant for the safety assessment. Moreover, sometimes, according
to reference [2], land-use planning constraints urge the operators to consider reduction
of the safety distances. Then, it may be proposed to choose 'realistic' scenarios by
taking account of the effectiveness of mitigation devices. In fact, because of the lack
of rules for identifying scenarios including safety measure effectiveness, the expert's
job is tricky and often involves large subjective elements.
Not only risk assessment experts, but also decision-makers are confronted with a
variety of approaches to assess and manage industrial risk. The difference of cultures
in the Member States results in a multiplicity of methods for the evaluation of major
accident hazards [3]. This fact makes the comparison of risk studies performed by
different analysts a difficult task and has significantly hampered the widespread use of
risk assessment for decision making purposes. At the recent EC-JRC International
Workshop on Promotion of Technical Harmonisation on Risk-Based Decision
Making, held in Italy in May 2000 [4], most participants agreed that comparative risk
assessment along harmonised procedures would significantly help the decision
understanding. A harmonised risk assessment methodology would thus ensure that
risk-based decision making provides the necessary transparency and strikes the right
balance between scientific understanding and precaution.
To propose a harmonised methodology for risk assessment is difficult. However,
some aspects of the different approaches can be put in common such as scenario
identification, severity evaluation and the integration of the effectiveness of the safety
management that affects the major accident probability of occurrence. Because of
these reasons there is a real need to establish common rules to identify scenarios
integrating the prevention management achieved by the operator and to propose a
harmonised method for their evaluation [5].
3. Objectives
The objective of the ARAMIS project is to create a new integrated risk assessment
methodology by combining the strong points from the different methods currently
used in risk assessment in European Countries.
The methodology will be used as a supportive tool to promote safety in the process
industry. In particular, it will contribute to speed-up the harmonised implementation
of the Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances known as SEVESO ÏÏ Directive.
Accordingly, this tool should be flexible enough to take into account the different
national cultures in industrial risk assessment like deterministic or risk-based
approaches, so that the new methodology could become a recommended tool used by
risk experts and endorsed by the risk decision-makers in the whole EU.
In technical terms, ARAMIS project aims at:
1. Establishing a methodology for accident scenarios identification taking into
account the prevention process carried out by the operators of SEVESO
establishments, and endorsed by the Competent Authorities and the decision-
makers in charge of risk control;
2. Composing an integrated risk index which takes into account:
• Consequence severity evaluation of scenarios;
• Prevention management effectiveness (preventative, protective and
mitigation measures) on initiating and aggravating events, thereby
reducing the probability of occurrence of major accidents;
• Environment vulnerability estimation.
4. Project work description
4.1 Introduction
The objective of ARAMIS is to develop a risk assessment methodology to evaluate
the risk level of establishments by taking into account the prevention measures
implemented by the operators and the vulnerability of its environment.
The project work plan is built to result in the characterisation of the risk level which
is based on the determination of Reference Accident Scenarios and integrates :
• Effects severity evaluation of scenarios;
• Prevention management effectiveness;
• Environment vulnerability estimation.
The end-users of the methodology are both the industrial companies and the
Competent Authorities in charge of the application of the SEVESO n Directive. Thus,
the valorisation and dissemination plan start at the beginning of the project with large
exchanges with the end-users partners in the consortium and in a Review Team.
4.2 Project description
This paragraph describes the three main phases of the project which are :
1. Development of the methodology;
2. Finalising and testing the methodology;
3. Valorisation and dissemination plan.
4.2.1 Development of the methodology
The development of the methodology starts with the identification of reference
scenarios, that are evaluated. Then the prevention management effectiveness and the
environment vulnerability of the establishment are characterised. All these results are
integrated to assess the risk level of a given establishment. The various phases of the
methodology are described in details hereunder.
Scenarios identification
The objective of this phase is to propose a methodology for the identification of
Accident Scenarios.
For industrial installations, the Major Accident Hazards will be first identified with
an algorithm based on the labelling of the substances (Directive 67/548/EEC) and the
conditions of their use (pressure, temperature, flow, etc.). Then, the Reference
Accident Scenarios will be determined from the Major Accident Hazards and from
the review of accidents which occurred on similar units. The Reference Accident
Scenarios will take into account the current practices (state of the art) mentioned in
the legal requirements with regard to design, operation and control, and mitigation.
Therefore, the Reference Accident Scenarios will use results from the work on the
prevention management effectiveness as described in Figure 1.
Reference Accident Scenarios define realistic scenarios, considering an installation
operated today. They will be used to evaluate the effects (severity) of the major
accident and describe the hazard potential.
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Figure 1. Scenarios identification procedure.
Evaluation of effects severity of scenarios
The objective of this task is to define a severity index S depending only on physical
parameters and characterising the possible effects of scenarios. It is intended to study
the physical characteristics of the phenomena involved in accidents (dispersion,
explosion, fire), and to take them into account to evaluate the severity of the
scenarios. The parameters to be considered are:
• The effect area A concerned with the phenomenon, for instance, a disc in case
of an explosion, the projection of a plume for gas dispersion;
• The phenomenon kinetics K: rapid for explosions, slower for dispersion and
fires;
• The capability of intervention / to mitigate the disaster: possible for fire and gas
dispersion, but possible only at the design step for explosion;
• The potential of domino effects D: fragment emission, interlocking of delayed
phenomena.
A severity index S is therefore a function of parameters only associated with physical
phenomena. All scenarios identified can then be evaluated and ranked with this
severity index according to the calculation of S0 for the Major Accident Hazards and
Sref for the Reference Accident Scenarios.
Prevention management effectiveness
The objective of this task is to define an index M characterising the prevention
management effectiveness.
Because technical and organisational factors are key issues to prevent major accident,
this task consists in developing a methodology to evaluate the management
effectiveness. Safety management applied in a Major Accident Prevention Policy
leads to define actions to manage technical, human and organisational factors.
The operational goal of safety management is to strengthen the barriers and lines of
defence against accidents (safety equipment or human operation). Safety management
contains a large number of responsibilities, tasks and functions that are difficult to
disentangle. A way of discriminating different levels in safety management is as
follows:
• Policy: The implicit or explicit statement of a company's intentions with respect
to plant safety, the objectives and goals for safety management and the way
safety is prioritised and incorporated in the company's daily management;
• Organisation: Organisation of safety management requires allocation of
resources, definition of tasks, and scheduling activities;
• Operation and maintenance: An important part of safety management is
maintaining the reliability of the safety-critical technical, human and
organisational components. This activity/responsibility includes:
• Training, education and competence of personnel;
• Maintenance of technical systems and introduction of new safety devices;
• Maintenance of procedures;
• Keeping up hazard awareness, e.g. by updating risk assessments.
• Leadership: Implementation of safety management requires leadership, showing
consistency between stated policies, intentions and objectives and decision-
making in daily plant management, setting examples, creating common values
and attitudes. Leadership has important impact on safety culture, safety
awareness and prevention of "unsafe acts".
The evaluation methodology will be built on the use of several research approaches:
• Analysis of the effectiveness of safety devices providing physical safety barriers
and lines of defence according to their characteristics (nature, availability,
reliability, maintainability, testability...)- This analysis follow the principle of
the norms ffiC 61508 and draft IEC 61511 (Functional safety: safety
instrumented systems for the process sector) and lead to general methods to
improve safety barriers and some results will be used for the scenario
identification.
• Analysis and comparison of specific safety management systems (e.g.
application of standards) and analysis of how safety policies are embedded in
the company's overall management system.
• Development and use of theoretical modelling of management tasks, with
Structured Analysis and Design Techniques (SADT) or function oriented
modelling. This will be built on the work carried out in earlier EU projects, like
I-RISK which established different ways of linking technical risk analyses with
organisational influences.
• Expert judgement, in particular to prioritise the management factors for
assessment purposes.
• Identification of safety performance indicators using audit techniques,
questionnaire techniques and analysis of incident reports.
• Development and validation of audit techniques.
Safety management affects the probability of occurrence of the scenarios. Therefore
the objective of this work will be:
• To assess the effectiveness of various forms and aspects of safety management
in preventing accidents.
• To develop reliable indicators that are a good measure of the effectiveness of a
plant safety management.
This information will be used to define a multidimensional index Mcharacterising the
prevention management effectiveness.
Environment vulnerability estimation
This phase aim at defining an index Vcharacterising the spatial vulnerability of the
environment of an hazardous establishment by characterising potential targets
(population, natural and man-made environment) and to estimate their sensitivity.
To reach this objective, the area of interest in the vicinity of a plant will be divided
into meshes : the potential targets belonging to each class (population, natural and
man-made environment) will be identified and localised with the support of
Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The sensitivity of the targets (workers of the
plant, residents, surface and underground waters, public buildings...) will be
characterised and ranked, using a multi-criteria ranking method (SAATY),
determining a scale of vulnerability levels. Vulnerability maps will be obtained by
calculating and combining the vulnerability of all the targets falling in the same mesh.
4.2.2 Finalising and testing the methodology
Characterisation of the Risk Level RL
The severity index S can be combined with the management effectiveness index M
and the vulnerability index K to define a risk level RL index of an installation in its
environment (See Figure 2). The objective of this phase is to study the relation
between S, M and Vto characterise the risk level. It will be studied whether the risk
level should remain characterised by the 3 indexes or whether the 3 indexes could be
aggregated to form a multidimensional index.
The ARAMIS method enables ranking the hazards only in terms of severity with the
calculation of the severity index S for each scenario. Then the scenarios identified in
several units are comparable. It also enables taking into account the efforts
(preventive measures) made by the company with the estimation of the prevention
management effectiveness M
The result also makes it possible to compare the risk level between two or more units
of an industrial group to define the priorities for the investment for safety.
Case studies
To validate and to improve the ARAMIS methodology, case studies will be carried
out with the collaboration of Companies and Competent Authorities in several
SEVESO establishments in Europe. For the selection of the test sites, it will be
assured that countries with a consequence-based and probabilistic approaches are
represented. After this exercise, the definition of the indexes will be modulated to
improve applicability and validity of the procedure.
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Figure 2. ARAMIS methodology representation.
4.2.3 Valorisation and dissemination
In the valorisation and dissemination plan, efforts will be made to transfer the
methodology to risk assessors and decision-makers, who are the end-users of the
methodology.
Industrial end-users are represented in the consortium through an association of
European industrial companies. It will help the consortium to relay information about
the project and its progress, to find plants for case studies and to disseminate the
methodology at the end of the project.
For dissemination, a web site was built (http://aramis.jrc.it) aiming at promoting the
project and disseminating the public results. An electronic newsletter will also be
released by the project management on the web site, after the progress meetings.
Moreover, a intermediate workshop is set to provide the end-users with some partial
results of the project and to collect comments to improve the relevancy of the further
work. And a final workshop is also planned at the end of the project to disseminate
the main results to all relevant stakeholders. The two workshops will be open to third-
parties not involved in the consortium and workshop proceedings will be issued and
made available on the web-site. Besides, in connection with the workshops, to ensure
the widest possible dissemination of the results during the project, the participants
will publish papers in scientific international journals and conferences.
5. Consortium description and involvement
The consortium consists of ten organisations involved in the risk analysis of major
accidents. They are presented in Table I.
INERIS, the co-ordinator of the project, has an international expertise in the field of
major accident prevention. It works as technical support for the national Competent
Authority in charge of the application of the SEVESO II Directive. INERIS will lead
with the steering committee the aggregation of the works for the risk level index
composition and validation. INERIS will also provide support for valorisation and
dissemination and for the Parallel Review.
EC-JRC-IPSC and especially MAHB has a recognised international expertise in the
field of major accident prevention. It has animated EU Working Groups dealing with
the application of the SEVESO I and ÏÏ Directives and is also experienced in the
development and use of accident databases and GIS tools at European level. MAHB
acts as leader of the activities related to valorisation and dissemination of the results
as well as leader of the parallel Review Team.
FPMs-MRRC has a great experience in the application of the SEVESO II Directive,
and already developed methodologies on the choice of accident scenarios to study
domino effects. It acts as the leader of work on Scenario Identification. In addition,
the MRRC also brings its experience about domino effects and accident consequences
modelling in the Severity Evaluation.
Table I: Description of partner organisation.
Organisation name
1. Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des
Risques Accidental Risk Division
2. European Commission - Joint Research Centre - Institute for
thé Protection and Security of the Citizen - Major Accident
Hazard Bureau
3. Faculté Polytechnique de Mons
Major Risk Research Center
4. Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
Centre for Studies on Technological Risk (CERTEC)
5. Association pour la Recherche et le Développement des
Méthodes et Processus Industriels - ARMINES
6. Ris0 National Laboratory
System Analysis Department
7. Université di Roma
Dipartimento Ingegneria Chimica
8. Central Mining Institute
Safety Management and Technical Hazards
9. Delft University of Technology
Safety Science Group
10. Institution of Chemical Engineers European Process Safety
Centre
Short name
INERIS
EC-JRC-
IPSC-MAHB
FPMs-MRRC
UPC
ARMINES
RISOE
UROM
CMI
TUD
IChemE-
EPSC
Country
France
Italy
Belgium
Spain
France
Denmark
Italy
Poland
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
UPC (through CERTEC) has a recognised expertise in the evaluation of the accident
consequences for SEVESO plants (dispersion, explosion, fire modelling). UPC will
develop research on the Severity Evaluation as task leader.
The "Pôle Cindyniques" of ARMINES has built a methodology to formalise the
development of accidents as a series of "particles of experience" which are collected
and documented from the analysis of reports, debriefing sessions and interviews.
Using this methodology, it will contribute to the scenario identification and the work
related to the prevention management effectiveness.
The SITE department of ARMINES has a long experience in environmental system
management characterisation. It will mainly focus on the prevention management
effectiveness and environment vulnerability characterisation.
The LGEI of ARMINES has competencies in using both multi-criteria ranking
methods (SAATY) and GIS. It has developed a methodology based on these two
aspects for studying risks in transportation of hazardous substances., and will
contribute to provide a methodology to rank the vulnerability of targets (human,
environmental, equipment) in the vicinity of plants to obtain a vulnerability
cartography used to characterise the spatial vulnerability.
RISOE is experienced with drawing up and evaluating safety reports for hazardous
installations. It has special experience with applying function-oriented modelling to
Decision Analysis: Methodology and Applications
analyse the effectiveness of the organisation of safety procedures and using
questionnaire techniques for assessment of safety culture. RISOE will be leader of the
work on the Prevention management effectiveness.
UROM is experienced in methodologies and software tools, including GIS systems,
to carry out risk analysis and area risk studies. Its activities will be mainly devoted to
the development of the methodology for characterising the potential targets and their
vulnerability. It will prepare a software tool for determining the environmental
vulnerability index basing on GIS information.
Due to its experience, on one hand in fire and explosion, and, on the other hand in
safety management and risk assessment, CMI will carry out research respectively for
work related to the Severity evaluation and the Management effectiveness by
analysing the implementation of management standards and guidelines.
Bringing its expertise in safety management modelling and risk assessment, TUD will
carry out a major effort in the ARAMIS research project in work on Prevention
management effectiveness with expertjudgement and audit tools developed at TUD.
IChemE-EPSC will participate in the dissemination of the results to the industrial
companies which are members or associates of the EPSC. It is important to notice that
a lot of EPSC members are end-users of the ARAMIS methodology. In the project,
EPSC will circulate to the members information related to the project and its results,
and care about the Review Team participation.
In addition to the consortium, a Review Team is indeed built up. It has an essential
role for the dissemination of the results through decision-makers involved in the
control of major accidents. The Review Team has a role in the management and will
comment on the applicability and usefulness of the results achieved. The involvement
in the methodology development of risk experts both from the Competent Authorities
and industrial companies will ensure that the methodology will be known and
recognised at a European level.
6. Contribution to the implementation of the SEVESO Directive
The project supports the European Research Area concerning the improvement of the
knowledge, encouragement of the Science-Industry dialogue and harmonisation in
decision-making process related to hazardous establishments.
The ARAMIS method will indeed be proposed as a recommended and harmonised
tool used by risk experts and recognised by the risk decision-makers in the EU.
Harmonising industrial risk assessments in Europe would significantly contribute to
the European Commission's overall efforts to establish harmonised policies following
the SEVESO ÏÏ Directive. Such a harmonised risk assessment procedure would be of
significant interest for both Competent Authorities and Industry: .
• It would constitute a risk evaluation and comparison tool for industrial sites,
which integrates the strengths of probabilistic and deterministic approaches;
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• The procedure would enable definition of progress plans within the framework
of a safety management system;
• It would enable to moderate the selection of scenarios by taking into account
realistic data and preventive measures;
• It will enable the evaluation and consideration of plant-specific safety devices
and safety management effectiveness, as required in the Safety Reports.
The partnership in the consortium and in the Review Team ensures that the ARAMIS
project will contribute on a very practical level to the EC research objectives built to
support the further development and consistent implementation of European policies.
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